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More than ªfty years
have passed since Hans Morgenthau introduced “realism” as an approach to
the study of international relations. Since then, the approach has withstood not
only a steady assault from such external quarters as liberal institutionalism,
the democratic peace school, and “constructivism” but also a marked divisive
tendency. Splinter groups have emerged, each waving an identifying adjective
to herald some new variant or emphasis. The ªrst of these came in the late
1970s, when Kenneth Waltz’s “neorealism” marked a major split from Mor-
genthau’s traditional realism, which henceforth became known as “classical”
realism.1 Since then, especially during the last decade, new variants and new
tags have proliferated. The ªeld of international relations now has at least two
varieties of “structural realism,”2 probably three kinds of “offensive realism,”3
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and several types of “defensive realism,”4 in addition to “neoclassical,” “con-
tingent,” “speciªc,” and “generalist” realism.5 The debate among partisans of
these differing views has been vigorous. It has also been helpful in clarifying—
if not resolving—some of the issues involved. A prominent participant in these
debates has been John Mearsheimer, under the banner of offensive realism. He
now offers readers a book-length statement of his views, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics.6Mearsheimer’s World
This volume has been eagerly awaited by many international relations schol-
ars and comes with strong recommendations from those who have read it. For
example, Samuel Huntington declares on the dust jacket that it “ranks with,
and in many respects supersedes, the works of Morgenthau and Waltz in the
core canon of the realist literature on international politics.” I attempt in this
essay to assess to what extent, and in what respects, this encomium may be
justiªed. I compare offensive realism mainly to Waltz’s theory, because
Mearsheimer himself casts Waltz as the leading defensive realist and his pri-
mary target. I conclude that the book is a major theoretical advance. It does not
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supersede Waltz, but nicely complements him by introducing a theoretical ra-
tionale for revisionist states. This provides a foundation for merging offensive
and defensive realism into a single theory. Mearsheimer also offers striking
new insights into balance-of-power theory, the role of geography, and the de-
bate over land power versus air and naval power. The theory is tested and il-
lustrated over two centuries of history and projected two decades into the
twenty-ªrst century. These projections are provocative and pessimistic—but
still plausible. The book’s principal weakness is its overemphasis on power
and security maximization as motivations of states’ behavior.
This essay follows the organization of the book. It begins with a summary
and critique of the core of offensive realism, then moves to a discussion of the
historical evidence bearing on the theory. Next, Mearsheimer’s ideas about
balancing and buck-passing are criticized and related to broader concepts in
alliance theory. After a brief look at his ªndings on the causes of war, the essay
concludes with an analysis of his prescriptions for future U.S. foreign policy.
The Core Theory: Mearsheimer versus Waltz
Mearsheimer begins with the assertion that great powers “maximize their rela-
tive power” (p. 21). That puts him close to Morgenthau, who famously pro-
claimed a never-ending struggle for power among states, arising from an
animus dominandi—that is, a natural human urge to dominate others.7
Mearsheimer, however, rejects this source of causation. There is a limitless
power struggle, he avers, but what drives it is not an appetite for power in the
human animal, but a search for security that is forced by the anarchic structure
of the international system. When all states have capabilities for doing each
other harm, each is driven to amass as much power as it can to be as secure as
possible against attack. This assumption of a security motivation and struc-
tural causation, of course, places Mearsheimer closer to Waltz. Where
Mearsheimer departs from Waltz is in his assertion that the search for power
and security is insatiable, whereas Waltz says that it has limits. Thus he dis-
agrees with Waltz on the question of “how much power states want.”
Mearsheimer makes the point succinctly: “For defensive realists, the interna-
tional structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional incre-
ments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of
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power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states.
Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely
found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful in-
centives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of ri-
vals, and to take advantage of those situations when the beneªts outweigh the
costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system” (p. 21).
Waltz conªrms the disagreement: “In anarchy, security is the highest end.
Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquil-
lity, proªt and power. The ªrst concern of states is not to maximize power but
to maintain their positions in the system.”8 Clearly, Waltz believes that “sur-
vival” (i.e., sufªcient security) can be assured with power well short of the “he-
gemonic” amount postulated by Mearsheimer.
The notions of “hegemon” and “potential hegemon” are prominent in
Mearsheimer’s theory. Global hegemony is virtually impossible, except for a
state that has acquired “clear-cut nuclear superiority,” deªned as “a capability
to devastate its rivals without fear of retaliation” (p. 145). Barring that unlikely
development, hegemony can only be regional. A hegemon is the only great
power in its system. Thus, if a region contains more than one great power,
there is no hegemon. The United States is the only regional hegemon in mod-
ern history, through its domination of the Western Hemisphere. Other states,
such as Japan and Nazi Germany, have reached for that status but failed.
States that do achieve hegemony are still not satisªed; they will seek to pre-
vent the rise of “peer competitors”—other hegemons—in nearby regions that
are accessible by land (pp. 41–42).9 In other words, they will try to maintain a
balance of power between at least two great powers in such an adjoining re-
gion, so that the attention and energy of these powers will be absorbed in de-
fending against each other.
A potential hegemon is the most powerful state in a regional system, but it is
more than that. It is so powerful that it stands a good chance of dominating its
region by overcoming its great power neighbors, if not all together, at least in
sequence. There is a “marked gap” between the size of its economy and army
and that of the second most powerful state in the system (p. 45). Potential
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hegemons always aspire to be hegemons, and they will not stop increasing
their power until they succeed.
It is only fair to point out that Mearsheimer’s vision seems less radical when
one takes into account various qualiªers. Great powers try to expand only
when opportunities arise. They will do so only when the beneªts clearly ex-
ceed the risks and costs. They will desist from expansion when blocked and
wait for a “more propitious moment” (p. 37). In a 1990 article, Mearsheimer
stated that one reason hegemony was rare was that “costs of expansion usually
outrun the beneªts before domination is achieved.”10
The term “expansion” appears to mean, although it is never explicitly stated,
increased power through increased control of territory. Mearsheimer devotes
considerable space to arguing, and demonstrating with historical data, that of-
fensive action often succeeds and that conquest does or can “pay” economi-
cally and strategically. He does not emphasize that expansion may contribute
(positively or negatively) to values other than power and security.
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism seems to predict much more conºict and
war than does Waltz’s defensive realism. States are never satisªed; they keep
reaching for more power, and these power urges seem bound to collide.
Mearsheimer’s states seem perilously close to Arnold Wolfers’s “hysterical
Caesars”—states that, “haunted by fear,” pursue “the will-of-the-wisp of abso-
lute security.”11 Waltz’s states are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more ori-
ented toward particular nonsecurity interests, and more willing to live with
only a modest amount of security. Sensible statesmen seek only an “appropri-
ate” amount of power, given their security needs, says Waltz.12
If his fundamental difference with Waltz is about the amount of security that
states desire or require, as Mearsheimer suggests, we can put a ªner point on
it. Security might be deªned crudely as the probability that one’s core interests
will not be challenged or violated over some reasonable time span. The
amount of security actually “purchased” by an increment of power would then
translate into an increase in that probability. But increments would be pur-
chased only so long as their marginal security value exceeded their opportu-
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nity costs. Waltz (or another defensive realist) might argue that at some point
well short of hegemony, power/security accumulation runs into diminishing
marginal returns, until costs begin to exceed beneªts and security purchases
fade to nothing. Mearsheimer denies that increments of security diminish in
value at the margin; in fact, he asserts the opposite: A state with a marked
power advantage over its rivals will behave more aggressively than one facing
powerful opponents “because it has the capability as well as the incentive to
do so” (p. 37). This seems to say that as a state accumulates power, its marginal
costs of further accumulation decline and/or marginal beneªts increase, so
that future increments are subject to increasing returns. Waltz, on the other
hand, declares that “states balance power rather than maximize it. States can
seldom afford to make maximum power their goal. International politics is too
serious a business for that.”13 In other words, after a state has balanced against
a dangerous opponent and thereby achieved a satisfactory degree of security,
there is no further need for power accumulation.
How these two theorists can reach such different conclusions is something of
a puzzle. Waltz (and most other realists) would ªnd little fault with
Mearsheimer’s list of “bedrock assumptions”: The system is anarchic, great
powers possess some offensive capabilities, no state can be certain of others’
intentions, survival is the primary goal, and actors are rational (pp. 30–31).
From these assumptions, Mearsheimer deduces that great powers will fear
each other and will constantly seek to alleviate this fear by maximizing their
share of world power: “States are disposed to think offensively toward other
states even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great
powers have aggressive intentions” (p. 34). But aggressiveness does not follow
necessarily from Mearsheimer’s explicit assumptions. It follows implicitly
from an unstated assumption: that great powers place a very high value on se-
curity, much higher than Waltz’s actors do. We might say that whereas Waltz
imagines a world of “satisªcers,” Mearsheimer sees only “maximizers.”
Mearsheimer suggests that the difference between them arises partly from
the difªculty of estimating levels of security and security requirements. He
challenges Waltz’s claim that a great power might feel secure with only an “ap-
propriate” amount of power, short of dominating the system. This is “not per-
suasive,” says Mearsheimer, because of the difªculty of estimating a level of
“appropriateness” and because what is a satisfactory security level today
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might not be sufªcient in the future. Great powers recognize that the best way
to ensure security is to “achieve hegemony now,” thereby eliminating any pos-
sibility of a future deªcit (pp. 34–35). Thus Mearsheimer’s great powers re-
quire a surplus of power over “appropriateness” to cover uncertainties,
possible miscalculation, and future surprises. It seems ironic that these two
structural realists should differ most basically about a “unit-level” factor: that
is, how much security do states desire?
the security dilemma
A central concept in nearly all realist theory is that of the “security dilemma.”
Mearsheimer quotes with approval John Herz’s original statement of the di-
lemma: “Striving to attain security from . . . attack, [states] are driven to ac-
quire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of
others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to
prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world
of competing units, power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security
and power accumulation is on” (p. 36).14
This, says Mearsheimer, is “a synoptic statement of offensive realism.” How-
ever, this is correct only in a limited sense: The great powers in offensive real-
ism indeed are interested primarily in security, and their security moves do
threaten others, causing them to take countermeasures, as in the security di-
lemma. But here the similarity begins to fade. The security dilemma, in most
formulations (including Herz’s), emphasizes how power and security competi-
tion can occur between states that want nothing more than to preserve the
status quo.15 Although no one is actually aggressive, uncertainty about others’
intentions forces each to take protective measures that appear threatening to
others. But there are no status quo powers in Mearsheimer’s world. All great
powers are revisionist and “primed for offense” (p. 3). Mearsheimer does al-
low that states do not know each other’s intentions for sure, but he also says
that they “are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of
other states” (p. 35). If all are revisionist and believe (correctly) that others are
too, it is hard to see any “dilemma.” Each great power’s security measures
present real threats to others, not merely hypothetical ones. Hence there is no
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question of “unnecessary” competition being generated by the need to ensure
against uncertain threats.
Moreover, security moves in the offensive realist scenario are moves of terri-
torial expansion, which involve actually taking something from others, rather
than merely preparing to do so, as with arms procurement or alliance forma-
tion. Because territorial expansion is itself predatory, it strongly implies future
predatory intentions. Thus, even though the expanding state’s ultimate objec-
tive is “security,” its actual behavior on the way to achieving this objective may
be virtually indistinguishable from pure aggrandizement. In this world, secu-
rity needs are bound to be incompatible; not everyone can increase their “share
of world power” at the same time. There is a lot of security competition but lit-
tle security “dilemma.”
Mearsheimer draws from Herz’s analysis the “implication” that “the best
way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and
gain power at their expense. The best defense is a good offense” (p. 36).16 He
takes issue with “some defensive realists” who emphasize that offensive strat-
egies are self-defeating, because they trigger balancing countermoves. “Given
this understanding of the security dilemma,” he declares, “hardly any security
competition should ensue among rational states, because it would be fruitless,
maybe even counter-productive, to try to gain advantage over rival powers.
Indeed, it is difªcult to see why states operating in a world where aggressive
behavior equals self-defeating behavior would face a ‘security dilemma.’ It
would seem to make good sense for all states to forsake war and live in
peace”(p. 417, n. 27). Mearsheimer could have pointed to the possible bad con-
sequences of “living in peace” as a reason why security measures, even “self-
defeating” ones, may be necessary. For example, inaction in the form of a
failure to take deterrent measures may be exploited by a rival, at a possible
cost far greater than the costs of action. The option of inaction is often omitted
in discussions of the security dilemma, even though it is the “other horn” of
the dilemma and usually essential to a full explanation of outcomes.
But Mearsheimer does not make this argument. Instead he contends that of-
fensive military action is not, or need not be, “self-defeating.” This is simply
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because conquest is often successful and proªtable. In this way, he defends his
theory against the charge that its actors are irrational in failing to anticipate the
balancing process. That many of them (e.g., Nazi Germany) were eventually
defeated does not show that they were irrational, he claims, but only that they
took a rational “calculated risk” that happened to be unsuccessful. They could
easily have been successful; indeed they came close. Balancing coalitions even-
tually formed, but these are “difªcult to put together” (p. 212).
One reason why the security dilemma does not ªt neatly into Mearsheimer’s
theory—or why it has to be bent out of shape to ªt—is the linking of an inher-
ently defensive goal—security and survival—with offensive behavior. In par-
ticular, it seems perverse to insist on discussing territorial expansion as a
means to achieving security, rather than to something beyond security (e.g.,
national glory, honor, or perhaps economic enrichment). A corollary of this is
the scant attention that Mearsheimer pays to various nonsecurity goals, such
as advancing an ideology or seeking national uniªcation. Mearsheimer’s chief
message about nonsecurity goals is that great powers pursue them only when
they are not in conºict with power and security imperatives (p. 46). Many con-
crete “national interests” will, of course, involve some combination of security
and nonsecurity values, just as strategies may require some mixture of offen-
sive and defensive elements. In many cases, nonsecurity interests may be the
more compelling. France, for example, was interested in the return of Alsace-
Lorraine after 1871 largely for reasons other than the province’s strategic or
security value. Of course, bringing nonsecurity values into Mearsheimer’s
theory might weaken the theory by placing limits on power needs and diluting
security motivations. But parsimony and logical elegance may need to be
sacriªced in favor of greater “realism.”
status quo versus revisionist states
Waltz’s theory, says Mearsheimer, suffers from a “status quo bias” (p. 20): It is
entirely a theory about how defensively motivated states behave. Waltz proba-
bly would answer that his theory does admit the presence of revisionist states,
even though their motivation, being generated at the “unit level,” is outside
the purview of his theory. Moreover, he need not distinguish between revision-
ist and status quo powers to make his theory work; competition for power and
security ensues even when all states seek only security.17 Although Waltz ad-
mits the possibility of revisionist states, he has virtually nothing to say about
Mearsheimer’s World 157
17. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” pp. 43–44.
what drives them; all he has to offer is words of caution: The “excessive accu-
mulation of power” will be self-defeating, because it will merely trigger bal-
ancing behavior.18
Mearsheimer sets out to correct Waltz’s alleged status quo bias. But in doing
so, he seems to overcorrect, although this impression may be largely due to his
confrontational style. If Waltz’s theoretical world is populated entirely by
status quo states, Mearsheimer’s contains only revisionist ones. All states, or at
least all great powers, seek to maximize power (i.e., military strength) because
every increment of power increases their chances of survival in an anarchic
system. Therefore there are virtually no status quo powers.19 Only in the rare
case when a state reaches the rank of hegemon does the drive for power relax
and the state become satisªed with the status quo. There may be occasional
lulls before then because of a lack of opportunity to expand, but the desire for
power remains and will be reactivated when circumstances permit.
Mearsheimer does make an important theoretical contribution in “bringing
the revisionist state back in,” thus satisfying Randall Schweller’s plea.20
Mearsheimer and Schweller are correct that Waltzian neorealism is primarily a
theory about how defensively oriented states behave in response to structural
constraints. Mearsheimer enlarges the scope of neorealist theory by providing
a theoretical rationale for the behavior of revisionist states, one that also locates
causation in international system structure. Starting from this similarity, the
two theories could work in tandem—the one chieºy explaining the security
behavior of status quo powers, the other the behavior of revisionist states. A
given state might be oriented offensively in some situations and defensively
in others; the two theories then would alternate in explaining its behavior.
The dynamics of the two models tend to interact. Balancing by status quo pow-
ers, for example, closes off avenues for expansion by revisionist states; buck-
passing by status quo states may open up such opportunities. When offensive
opportunities are blocked, aggressive states may not just “lie low” but actively
participate in defensive balancing against their rivals. A balancing coalition
may move beyond mere defeat of an aggressive state to offensive action de-
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signed to weaken it. There is already a good deal of overlap between these two
realist theories and a potential for more.21 The overlap can be exploited to deal
with mixed motives and situations.
The Core Theory: Historical Cases
Mearsheimer tests and demonstrates the empirical validity of his theory by ex-
amining six cases of great power behavior: Japan from 1868 to 1945; Germany
from 1862 to 1945; the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991; Italy from 1861 to 1943;
Great Britain from 1792 to 1945; and the United States from 1800 to 1990. He
seeks to show that “the history of great-power politics involves primarily the
clashing of revisionist states” and that “the only status quo powers that appear
in the story are regional hegemons.” The evidence must also show that great
powers “do not practice self-denial when they have the wherewithal to shift
the balance in their favor, and that the appetite for power does not decline once
states have a lot of it” (pp. 168–169).
The cases of Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy strongly support
Mearsheimer’s theory. These states were constantly alert for opportunities to
expand and took advantage of them. Further, they became more aggressive the
more power they accumulated. The primary motive in all four cases was in-
creasing security. Their leaders “talked and thought” like offensive realists
(p. 170). There were a few exceptions, but according to Mearsheimer, these are
mostly explainable in the theory’s terms. Thus instances of nonexpansion were
largely the result of successful deterrence, rather than a disappearance of the
motive to expand (p. 169). Germany between 1871 and 1900, for example, was
a nonaggressive state, but this was because any further expansion beyond the
uniªcation of Germany would have triggered a great power war that Germany
would lose. So, as the theory predicts, it accepted the status quo, lying low un-
til 1903, by which time it had become a potential hegemon, possessing both
more wealth and a more powerful army than any other European state. The
aggressive policy of Weltpolitik soon followed. A reasonable question can be
raised, especially in the case of Nazi Germany, as to whether these states were
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driven chieºy by security aspirations or by other values, such as economic ag-
grandizement, prestige, or power as an end in itself. Moreover, it is not con-
vincing that states that were temporarily nonaggressive, such as late
nineteenth-century Germany, nevertheless entertained secret aggressive aims.
Such an interpretation tends to make the theory nonfalsiªable because any
state that desisted from power maximization could be said to be merely biding
its time.
Mearsheimer’s theory faces a much harder test, it would seem, in the two
cases involving democratic powers—the United States and Great Britain. They
pass the test, however, although on somewhat different grounds. By 1900 the
United States had established itself as a great power and hegemon in the West-
ern Hemisphere and possessed the capability to expand into Europe and Asia.
Yet it did not do so, in apparent contradiction of Mearsheimer’s claim that
great powers attempt to maximize power. Nor did Great Britain aspire to hege-
mony in Europe during the peak of its power in the nineteenth century.
Mearsheimer explains these anomalies in terms of “the stopping power of wa-
ter”—large bodies of water, he claims, drastically limit the power-projection
capability of armies. Thus the Atlantic Ocean not only protected the United
States from Europe but also Europe from the United States; likewise the Eng-
lish Channel blocked British expansion in Europe. Mearsheimer marshals little
theoretical or historical support for this thesis, other than to emphasize the
difªculty of carrying out amphibious landings against a well-defended shore-
line. The apparent counterexample of Japan’s successful invasions is neu-
tralized by citing the weakness of its continental opponents, Russia and
China (p. 265). But then one wonders whether the “stopping power” resides in
the water or the strength of opponents—or simply a lack of interest in
expansion.
Having attained hegemonic status in its own region, the United States acted
in other regions as offensive realism predicts: It intervened as an “offshore bal-
ancer” to prevent the rise of hegemons in other regions—notably Europe and
Northeast Asia. No matter that the United States passed the buck to others in
the years just prior to the two world wars. The theory predicts that regional
hegemons do not intervene in neighboring regions until it is clear that local
powers cannot contain their would-be hegemon. When intervention became
necessary in Europe and Northeast Asia, the United States acted as Mear-
sheimer’s theory predicts. Great Britain did likewise. Mearsheimer claims that
the behavior of both Britain and the United States “corresponds with the pre-
dictions of offensive realism” (p. 264).
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Perhaps the case studies would have been less vulnerable to a suspicion of
selection bias if some other states, or other time periods, had been chosen. Ja-
pan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries are about as aggressive a collection of states as could be imagined.
Mearsheimer pleads “reasons of space” to explain his decision not to include
other European great powers, such as Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia be-
fore 1917, but says he is conªdent that their foreign policy histories “would not
contradict—indeed, would support—the main tenets of offensive realism”
(p. 465, n. 2).
Balancing and Passing the Buck: The Theory
Mearsheimer’s offensive realist states are not on the offensive all the time. Oc-
casionally they are faced with having to deter and contain a rival that seeks to
gain power at their expense. In that defensive role, they have a choice between
two strategies—balancing and buck-passing. Balancing means acting to pre-
serve an existing distribution of power (e.g., by supporting a state that is chal-
lenged by a revisionist state). Buck-passing is to hold back and take no action,
with the intent of shifting the burden of resistance onto an ally or some other
state. The choice, Mearsheimer argues, will turn on the structure of the system
and geography. There are three possible system structures: bipolar, balanced
multipolar, and unbalanced multipolar.22 The bipolar system is uninteresting
because buck-passing is impossible—there is no one to “catch” a buck passed
by a superpower. Buck-passing is most attractive in a balanced multipolar sys-
tem because, with roughly equal capabilities, each great power individually
can hold off an aggressor, and is therefore capable of “accepting” the buck. In
an unbalanced system, when one state is markedly more powerful than its
neighbors (a potential hegemon), those neighbors are too weak to accept the
buck, so everyone will have a strong common interest in balancing against the
powerful state. But buck-passing occurs even in an unbalanced system and is
the “clearly preferred” strategy, Mearsheimer concludes, based on his histori-
cal cases (p. 160).
The reasons buck-passing is preferred, he speculates, are threefold. First, it is
cheap: The cost of ªghting is borne by the ally and oneself takes a “free ride.”
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actual military capabilities—between the great powers in a system, not the formation or
nonformation of defensive coalitions.
Second, the aggressor and the buck-catcher may get involved in a long and de-
bilitating war that leaves the buck-passer stronger than both. Third, if a state
faces several adversaries, it may employ buck-passing to tackle them
sequentially.
The chief drawback to passing the buck is, of course, that the designated
buck-catcher might fail to resist the aggressor, or resist unsuccessfully, leaving
the buck-passer in the ªeld alone with the aggressor. Thus the Soviet Union
found itself all alone with Germany in 1940, after France and Britain failed to
catch the buck that the Soviet Union passed them in 1939 (p. 161). Mear-
sheimer does not emphasize what presumably is the central trade-off in choos-
ing between balancing and buck-passing: maximization of deterrence at the
cost of certain involvement if deterrence fails (balancing) versus less effective
deterrence plus a greater chance of staying out of war if it occurs (buck-
passing).
The geographical variables are chieºy whether the aggressor and the threat-
ened states share a common border, and whether they are separated by water.
When challenger and defender are contiguous on land, balancing will be fa-
vored because otherwise the challenger might easily overrun the defender.
When they are not contiguous, and especially when they are separated by wa-
ter, buck-passing will be frequent because there is a good chance the immedi-
ate defender can defend itself without aid (pp. 271–272).
In sum, balancing will be most strongly favored in a unbalanced multipolar
system when the immediate protagonists are neighbors on land. Buck-passing
will be the strategy of choice in a balanced system, especially when the de-
fender is either insular or located at some distance from the challenger.
This subtheory of offensive realism is innovative and interesting in several
ways. First, it posits two differently structured multipolar systems, whereas
Waltz considers only one—implicitly a system of equal powers. Mearsheimer’s
unbalanced multipolarity might be considered a model of the contemporary
“unipolarity,” although he does not interpret it that way.
Second, his melding of geographical factors with comparative capabilities is
a welcome improvement over other analyses that too often ignore the impor-
tance of geography. Mearsheimer devotes an entire chapter to this subject, em-
phasizing “the stopping power of water” and the superiority of land forces
over naval and air power.
Third, Mearsheimer ªnds little empirical support or theoretical merit for
“bandwagoning”—allying with rather than against a powerful state—which
some theorists consider the opposite of balancing. Although minor states may
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have no other choice, great powers rarely bandwagon. Mearsheimer gives a
peculiar reason for this rarity: Bandwagoning, he says, entails shifting the dis-
tribution of power in the stronger ally’s favor, which “violates the basic canon
of offensive realism—that states maximize relative power” (p. 163). Band-
wagoning means “conceding that [the] formidable new partner will gain a dis-
proportionate share of the spoils they conquer together” (pp. 162–163). But it is
hard to see how joining up with a more powerful state would necessarily entail
a sacriªce in relative gains. Why not a proportionate sharing of the spoils? Or a
disproportionate share to the joiner, who might have provided the last crucial
increment of power to achieve victory? Indeed Waltz asserts a different reason
for the infrequency of bandwagoning: “If states wished to maximize power,
they would join the stronger side and we would see not balances forming but a
world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not
bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The ªrst concern of
states is not to maximize power, but to maintain their positions in the sys-
tem.”23 Thus Mearsheimer and Waltz arrive at the same conclusion—that
bandwagoning is a rare occurrence—but by using different assumptions about
motivation: power maximizing versus power balancing. Of the two, Waltz’s
reasoning is the more plausible.
Balancing and Passing the Buck: The History
In ªve case studies, Mearsheimer shows that great powers tend to favor buck-
passing over balancing. As predicted, buck-passing was most evident in the
single case when the challenger—Bismarckian Prussia—was not yet a potential
hegemon. France and Austria, in close sequence, misjudged that the other
could defeat Prussia by itself, and so failed to ally to prevent Prussian victories
in 1866 and 1870. Great Britain and Russia also stood aside, but they actually
wanted a strengthened Prussia—in Britain’s case, to balance against France
and Russia; for Russia, to balance against Austria and France. So these two
powers really balanced rather than passed the buck.
Balancing coalitions did form against aggressors in the other cases. Yet there
were conspicuous instances of buck-passing as well. Clear-cut balancing oc-
curred in the lead-up to World War I in Europe, between the Triple Alliance
and the Triple Entente. Buck-passing was ruled out for France and Russia be-
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cause neither was strong enough by itself to stand up to Germany’s superior
military strength, and both were geographically vulnerable because of their
shared borders with Germany. A factor in British balancing was Russia’s defeat
by Japan, which left France alone on the continent with Germany, too over-
matched to “accept the buck.” There was much buck-passing in Europe during
the 1930s—between France and Great Britain, and between the Soviet Union
and the Western powers. Germany was not a potential hegemon until 1939, so
there was reason to hope that some other state could contain it. For Britain,
that hope vanished with the German absorption of rump Czechoslovakia in
March 1939; so it abruptly ceased passing the buck. Stalin persisted, and then
was surprised when the French in 1940 failed to “catch” the buck he had
passed to them.
The defensive goals of a regional hegemon in Mearsheimer’s scheme boil
down to preventing the rise of a peer competitor in adjoining regions, one that
might threaten its regional hegemony. If one did appear, the outside hegemon
would ªrst try to pass the buck to the competitor’s local neighbors. Only if that
was unsuccessful would it engage in offshore balancing to reestablish a bal-
ance of power in the region. Offshore balancing might be described as a combi-
nation of buck-passing and balancing: Stay out (optimally behind a broad
body of water); meanwhile build up one’s military strength and intervene only
when absolutely necessary to preserve a balance.
alliance politics
One of Mearsheimer’s great strengths is his ability to cut to the core of complex
subjects. His balancing versus buck-passing choice certainly is at the center of
alliance politics. He has not, however, presented anything close to a complete
picture of alliance diplomacy. He does not consider that alliances can be a cost-
effective substitute for military expansion. If security is the ultimate objective,
alliances deserve equal billing with territorial conquest and armament as alter-
native or complementary means. Occasionally we get fascinating, perhaps in-
advertent, glimpses of the bigger picture, usually in the case histories. For
example, Mearsheimer suggests that great powers might want to balance “in-
ternally” while buck-passing externally, employing an arms buildup both to
deter the aggressor from attacking and to hedge against the possibility of be-
coming the target of attack. Diplomatically, a buck-passer might want to main-
tain good relations with the potential aggressor, in the hope that this would
divert the latter’s belligerent attention to the intended “buck-catcher.” Com-
ments such as these are tantalizing and leave the reader hungering for further
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development, even formalization,24 of the larger subject of how relations with
an adversary impinge on alliance relations. Much of Mearsheimer’s analysis
seems based on a mental image of three states—attacker, victim, and possible
defender—but he has not attempted anything like a full treatment of the logic
of the triad.25
Mearsheimer barely makes contact with the “alliance security dilemma”—
that is, the tension between fears of being abandoned or entrapped by an ally.26
Reassuring an ally of one’s support may reduce the fear of abandonment but
increase the risk of entrapment, through the ally exploiting one’s support to
advance its own interests. Distancing oneself from the ally to avoid entrap-
ment may precipitate its abandonment. Whereas the balancing versus buck-
passing choice is about alliance strategies toward an adversary27—resistance or
nonresistance—the abandonment-entrapment dichotomy highlights the costs
and risks of that choice for the alliance relationship itself. Balancing risks en-
trapment, and buck-passing risks abandonment. This alliance security di-
lemma may become intertwined with the traditional security dilemma
between adversaries, discussed above, producing, through balancing, an “inte-
grative/hostility spiral” of tighter alliance relations and more hostile adver-
sarial interaction. This is the “chain gang” that dragged the European powers
into war in 1914. Or an excess of buck-passing could produce a “dis-
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trary to his depreciation of bandwagoning. Perhaps Mearsheimer does not emphasize band-
wagoning because he is analyzing strategies for great powers, not small states.
25. Classical treatments of this logic include Georg Simmel, “The Number of Members as Deter-
mining the Sociological Form of the Group,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 8, No. 1 (July 1902);
and Theodore Caplow, Two against One: Coalitions in Triads (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
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otal Deterrence,” book ms., forthcoming.
26. On abandonment and entrapment, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution before and
after Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 6; and Michael Mandelbaum,
The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chap. 2. On the alliance security dilemma, see Glenn H.
Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), chap. 6.
27. Mearsheimer deªnes both balancing and buck-passing as strategies “to prevent aggressors
from upsetting the balance of power” (p. 139). This seems to be an odd deªnition of buck-passing,
which is, more accurately, a means of avoiding the costs of resisting an aggressor. Inadvertently or
not, this language avoids a discussion of buck-passing as free riding in a collective goods situation.
integrative/conciliatory spiral” of looser alliance relations and appeasement
between adversaries, as occurred between the Western powers and the Soviet
Union in the 1930s.28
The alliance security dilemma turns on several variables, but essentially on
the level of dependence and ªrmness of commitment between allies. Low de-
pendence and weak commitment are consistent with Mearsheimer’s balanced
system and buck-passing strategies, while high dependence and ªrm commit-
ment are characteristic of an unbalanced system and balancing strategies.
Mearsheimer’s ªnding that states prefer buck-passing over balancing implies
that they are more concerned about entrapment than about abandonment, al-
though he does call attention to the possibility that buck-passing can “wreck
the alliance” (p. 159).
Nor does Mearsheimer have much to say about conciliatory policies toward
an adversary. Appeasement is “fanciful and dangerous” because, like
bandwagoning, it “shifts the balance of power” in the aggressor’s favor and
thus “contradicts the dictates of offensive realism” (pp. 163–164). Mearsheimer
explicitly rejects a deªnition of appeasement as “a policy designed to reduce
tensions with a dangerous adversary by eliminating the cause of conºict be-
tween them” (p. 463, n. 58). As in his deªnition of bandwagoning, this insis-
tence on deªning cooperation with an adversary as involving power sacriªce
seems to reºect the author’s theoretical commitment to power maximization.
He does allow for “special circumstances” in which a great power might con-
cede power to another state without violating balance-of-power logic: making
concessions to one so as to concentrate resources against another, or to buy
time to mobilize resources internally (pp. 164–165). But these seem to be reluc-
tant qualiªcations of a general bias toward a hard-line offensive stance. One
can think of other ways in which conciliatory policies might be useful even to
an expansionary state. For example, conciliatory tactics short of appeasement
might appeal to an offensive-minded state as a means of discouraging the for-
mation of balances against it, or of weakening opposing alliances. Diplomatic
détente could be a useful policy during periods when a state’s power buildup
has been frustrated by opposition. Mearsheimer’s brief treatment (ªve pages)
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Christensen and Snyder attribute the differing pre-1914 and pre-1939 patterns to different beliefs
about the inherent superiority of the offense or defense. However, although these beliefs may have
played some role, I would argue that more fundamental determinants were alliance interdepen-
dence and commitment, as these matters were affected by tensions between adversaries.
on “creating world order” and “cooperation among states” stands in conspicu-
ous contrast to Morgenthau’s two chapters on “diplomacy” and Waltz’s whole
chapter on “management” of the system by the great powers.29
The Causes of War
Mearsheimer also employs his three structural models in an assessment of the
causes of war. Bipolarity is the most peaceful, unbalanced multipolarity the
most prone to conºict and war, and balanced multipolarity somewhere in be-
tween. The two multipolar systems are more unstable (deªning instability as
proneness to war) than bipolar ones for three reasons: (1) they have more po-
tential conºict dyads, (2) the likelihood of power imbalances is greater, includ-
ing two states ganging up on one, and (3) there is greater potential for
miscalculation. This reasoning is similar to that of Waltz and other realists.
Mearsheimer’s claim that unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable sys-
tem is original, however. By deªnition, an unbalanced multipolar system con-
tains a potential hegemon. Such a state will push further, toward regional
hegemony, “because hegemony is the ultimate form of security” (p. 345), and
because it has the capability to achieve supremacy. Other states become more
fearful and will take greater risks in attempting to correct the imbalance. These
balancing efforts, however, will be viewed as “encirclement” by the would-be
hegemon, who may take further steps to advance its security, setting off a spi-
ral of mutual fear (p. 345) that is likely to culminate in war.
Mearsheimer’s historical data strongly conªrm this hypothesis. During 109
years of European history, war was going on 2.2 percent of the time in bipolar-
ity, 18.3 percent of the time in balanced multipolarity, and 79.5 percent of the
time in unbalanced multipolarity. Thus, according to Mearsheimer, “Whether a
multipolar system contains a potential hegemon like Napoleonic France,
Wilhelmine Germany, or Nazi Germany has a profound inºuence on the pros-
pects for peace” (p. 359). One interesting point emerges from combining the
data on war frequency and alliance strategies: The same system type that en-
couraged balancing over buck-passing—unbalanced multipolarity—produced
the most wars. There could hardly be any stronger conªrmation of what many
realists have surmised: The balance-of-power process is not particularly con-
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ducive to peace. That hypothesis could be extended: War is especially likely
when a power-maximizing state collides with the balancing process.
Looking Forward
At least until the shock of September 11, 2001, the belief was widespread that
the end of the Cold War had transformed international politics from a largely
competitive arena to one of cooperation. Thus the realist stock-in-trade—the
inevitability of conºict and war in an anarchic system—seemed hopelessly out
of date. Mearsheimer takes dead aim at this view, insisting that “realism will
offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next
century” (p. 361). First, he takes apart the main opposing arguments that pre-
dict a peaceful world—institutions, economic interdependence, the “demo-
cratic peace,” and nuclear weapons. These treatments are necessarily brief and
essentially summarize arguments that he has made in previous articles. For ex-
ample, he argues that international institutions are essentially irrelevant be-
cause they merely reºect state interests and policies and do not exert any
independent effects on the struggle for power (pp. 363–364).30
Focusing the tools of offensive realism on Europe and Northeast Asia,
Mearsheimer foresees greater instability, perhaps war, in these regions over the
next 20 years. The prediction is based on two central variables that are them-
selves linked (1) whether U.S. troops remain deployed in these regions, and (2)
possible changes in regional power structures.
Mearsheimer shares the widespread belief that peace in these areas is cur-
rently being sustained by the “American paciªer,” the physical presence of
U.S. troops.31 Much will depend, therefore, on whether the United States re-
mains so engaged. But that will turn, he argues, on possible changes in the
structure of power in each region, in particular, on whether a potential
hegemon arises. If that does not occur, the United States eventually will with-
draw its troops. The withdrawal would increase the potential for conºict, ªrst
by removing the “paciªer” and second by fostering change in the regional
power structures.
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Should a potential hegemon appear in either region, creating an unbalanced
multipolar system, the U.S. troops will either remain in place or return after
they have been withdrawn. This will create an even more dangerous situation
because the United States will face a powerful rival that is geared up for ag-
gression and conquest in a system that is inherently the least stable of all. In
short, either way, great power relations are likely to be less peaceful than they
have been recently.
Mearsheimer comes down on the side of the ªrst scenario—U.S. troops will
probably come home sometime in the ªrst two decades of this century. Con-
cretely, in Europe, he predicts that after the United States withdraws its troops,
Germany will acquire nuclear weapons, thus transforming itself into a great
power and a potential hegemon. The United States would not redeploy its
forces because the other European powers would be able to keep Germany
from dominating Europe without U.S. help. Without the American paciªer, Eu-
rope would be subject to intense security competition, and possibly war, be-
cause the structure of its regional system would have been transformed to the
most dangerous type—unbalanced multipolarity. Particularly dangerous
would be security competition between Germany and Russia for control of
central Europe.
Mearsheimer reserves his greatest fears, however, for Northeast Asia and
China. He presents two scenarios: one in which China’s economic growth
slows down and Japan remains the wealthiest state in Asia, and another in
which China continues its rapid growth and surpasses Japan. In the ªrst case,
neither country is a potential hegemon, so the United States brings its troops
home. Japan is then forced to acquire a nuclear deterrent and to build up its
conventional forces. The regional system then is the moderately stable one of
balanced multipolarity among China, Japan, and Russia. There would be a
dangerous element of instability, however, in the process of Japan acquiring a
nuclear capability, which Russia and China would be tempted to preempt.
And simply becoming a nuclear power would increase fears of Japan in the
area, probably precipitating an intense security competition.
In the second Asian scenario, China surpasses Japan, and perhaps even the
United States, and becomes a potential regional hegemon. The United States
then retains its forces in Northeast Asia to balance China or returns if it has al-
ready withdrawn. The system is then one of unbalanced multipolarity with
China driving toward full hegemony and the other powers, including the
United States, attempting to encircle China. Mearsheimer concludes with one
of his few explicit pieces of policy advice for the United States: Shift from “en-
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gaging” China to containing it (i.e., do whatever can be done to slow China’s
growth).
In sum, the two gross variables in Mearsheimer’s scheme—deployment of
U.S. troops and changes in regional power structures—operate alternately as
cause or consequence. The troops are likely to stay if a potential hegemon ap-
pears in either region; otherwise they will be withdrawn. But the withdrawal
itself may cause changes in regional power structures, largely through the
nuclearization of Germany or Japan and their reemergence as great powers.
Obviously, a great deal of the causal weight in this logic rests on the deploy-
ment of U.S. forces. Mearsheimer seems certain that U.S. troops will come
home from Europe before 2020, and only slightly less certain about the troops
in Japan and Korea. In support, he cites evidence that the United States and its
allies are “drifting apart” (p. 391), and that the allies are losing conªdence in
the reliability of the United States. Moreover, no potential hegemon is likely to
arise in the near future, and even if one did appear, it would be containable by
local powers. Hence the U.S. troops are likely to be brought home. The United
States will revert to its traditional policy of offshore balancing—delaying in-
tervention in Eurasian wars until absolutely necessary to restore a balance,
thus minimizing war costs and being in position to dominate postwar
arrangements.
But these arguments are not compelling. Theoretically, they do not take ac-
count of U.S. anticipation of what others might do in response to U.S. moves.32
If the withdrawal of troops would lead to dangerous consequences, and the
U.S. government understands that, the troops will not be withdrawn. Em-
pirically, there have been no serious moves toward bringing them home. The
allied governments, by most indications, want them to stay. If anything, U.S.
commitments to allies have been strengthened and expanded. It is widely un-
derstood that the U.S. physical presence reassures the allies against potential
threats from each other. What could bring about a change? The most obvious
answer points to domestic politics: The American people may not tolerate the
expense and risk of keeping these forces abroad once they fully realize that
their original purpose is no longer relevant. But the knowledge (in public as
well as elite opinion) that withdrawal would precipitate the nuclearization of
Germany and Japan, and probably also unleash serious regional security
conºicts, should be enough to keep them in place.
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There is, however, a major wild card: how U.S. relations with its European
and Asian allies will be affected by the “war on terror” and its fall-out. Possi-
bly, the tendency in this campaign toward adopting unconventional military
methods, as well as developing new forms of alliance and new allies, will re-
duce the apparent utility of quasi-permanent deployments of conventional
forces. Or the geographical focus of U.S. military activity may shift, more than
it already has, away from Europe and Northeast Asia toward areas more
closely linked to terrorist and proliferation threats. These possibilities, it seems,
tend to support Mearsheimer’s predictions.33
Conclusion
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is a pessimistic book, even as realist books go.
Of course there is nothing wrong with pessimism if it is based on empirical
truth and solid logic. The trouble here is in the logic: Although it is coherent
and without obvious inconsistency, it is sometimes pushed to extremes. Ex-
hibit A in this respect is the claim that all great powers all the time are primar-
ily concerned with maximizing power so as to maximize their security. Can it
really be true that the world is condemned to a future of constant conºict and
power struggles simply because of its anarchic political system and the desire
of its units to survive? Are great powers really as ambitious, self-centered, and
single-minded as this hypothesis implies? Granted that security seeking will
be natural in such a system, is there any compelling reason why the search
must persist à l’outrance until the searcher dominates its neighbors?34
Mearsheimer’s unremitting focus on power-security competition among
great powers necessarily means that many aspects of international politics nor-
mally considered essential are either given short shrift or omitted entirely.
Conversely, the struggle for power assumes a bloated role far beyond what
might be considered “realistic.” Most conspicuously slighted in the analysis
are the nonsecurity interests of states, such as advancement of an ideology, na-
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tional uniªcation, or protection of human rights. There is no mention of trans-
national movements such as terrorism and religious and ethnic strife. The book
slights norms, institutions, and most kinds of interstate cooperation. Domestic
politics are entirely omitted. Some might argue that these are topics that
Mearsheimer, as a realist, should not be required to address. That depends,
however, on how much distortion has been introduced by omitting them. In
my view, too much, unless the power-maximizing claim is considerably
modiªed.
There are two salient ways of modifying this claim: via a marginal utility cal-
culation or an ideal-type model. In the ªrst, states weigh costs and risks
against security and other beneªts when they decide whether to attempt ex-
pansion. Some of the costs and risks, as well as some of the beneªts, will nor-
mally be in nonsecurity coin. Some will be anticipations of costs that may be
imposed by other actors in resistance. Some of the beneªts may be reduced, as
security goals are pared down to match the limits of anticipated power. These
considerations and qualiªcations amount to approaching security decisions as
problems in maximizing marginal utility. The original hypothesis is deºated to
“great powers expand until marginal costs begin to exceed marginal beneªts.”
Such a hypothesis, obviously, is less extreme, more embracing, and more plau-
sible—even if less parsimonious—than the original claim.35
The ideal-type model would grant the original claim the status of “initial
working hypothesis”; something not intended as a statement of empirical truth
but as a benchmark from which deviations might be identiªed and measured.
Few social scientists present their theories explicitly in this form, and
Mearsheimer does not do so. What they do, and what Mearsheimer does, is to
state the theory as a sufªcient explanation of its subject matter, leaving it up to
the reader to understand that it is really only a partial explanation (and to keep
his grain of salt handy). The ideal-type model preserves the initial hypothesis
intact, but only as a point of departure for more “realistic” estimates.
The seeming exaggerations in Mearsheimer’s theory make his historical
cases crucial. The cases do show a high degree of congruence with the theory.
Several great powers were expansionist on a big scale over a substantial part of
their history. One notices, however, that all Eurasian revisionists, from Napo-
leon to Hitler to Tojo, were eventually blocked through the operation of the
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35. Wolfers puts it well: “Policy-makers must decide whether a speciªc increment of security is
worth the speciªc additional deprivations which its attainment through power requires.” Ibid.
p. 91. For a similar formulation, see Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 107.
balance of power. None reached the ªnish line in Mearsheimer’s race. Only the
United States, in the Western Hemisphere, became a hegemon, against weak
opposition. Thus it would appear that balance of power trumps power
maximization.
Such quibbles aside, this is an excellent book. It is a clear and forceful exposi-
tion of offensive realist theory. It enriches alliance theory, advances new in-
sights into geography, and argues cogently for the superiority of land power
over naval and air power. It does not supersede Waltz’s broader and more
moderate neorealist theory, although it employs many of the same assump-
tions. Rather it complements Waltz, chieºy by introducing a theoretical ratio-
nale for revisionist states. This creates a potential for integrating offensive and
defensive realist theory. Perhaps it is time to end the proliferation of labels and
theories in the realist camp and add up what we all have in common.
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